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Abstract
This paper presents novel empirical evidence on key predictions of heterogeneous rm
models by examining stock market reactions to the Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment of 1989 (CUSFTA). I derive testable predictions for a class of models based on Melitz
(2003). Using the uncertainty surrounding CUSFTAs ratication, I show that the pattern
of abnormal returns of Canadian manufacturing rms was strongly consistent with predic-
tions related to export (U.S.) tari¤ reductions, but less so with predictions related to import
(Canadian) tari¤ reductions. Lower Canadian tari¤s did have an e¤ect through the implied
reduction in intermediate input tari¤s, however.
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Trade Agreement
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1 Introduction
The last decade has seen a revolution in the theoretical analysis of trade liberalization episodes.
Since the seminal contribution by Melitz (2003), models with heterogeneous rms have all but
replaced traditional modeling approaches with homogeneous rms. The key innovation of Melitz
and subsequent extensions was to show how trade liberalization leads to aggregate productiv-
ity gains through intra-industry reallocation. The mechanism underlying this reallocation is
the di¤erential impact of trade liberalization on exporting and non-exporting rms. While
exporters benet from increased access to foreign markets, non-exporters su¤er lower prots
due to increased product and factor market competition. Together with the assumption that
exporters are more productive than non-exporters, the ensuing reallocation of market shares
towards exporting rms raises aggregate productivity.
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Many of the assumptions and predictions of heterogeneous rm models are consistent with
evidence from a large empirical literature which has emerged over the years. The strongest
evidence is available for the productivity advantage of exporters, and for the self-selection of
more productive rms into export markets (e.g., Bernard et al. (2007)).1 Tybout (2001)
summarizes several papers which show that trade liberalization episodes were accompanied by
market share reallocations. A smaller literature also provides more direct evidence on the impact
of lower trade costs on the reallocation of market shares between exporters and non-exporters
(e.g., Treer (2004), Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006)).2
A common feature of all empirical studies to date is their ex-post character. That is, they
track the rm- or sector-level variables of interest for a number of years and try to isolate the
impact of trade policy changes from a large number of confounding factors. Depending on the
specic setting of the liberalization episode, this can pose considerable econometric challenges
(see, for example, Tybout, 2001).
In this paper, I take a di¤erent approach to providing evidence for the di¤erential impact of
trade liberalization across rms. I do so by using stock market reactions surrounding the im-
plementation process of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 (henceforth,
CUSFTA). Under the assumption that unanticipated changes in the likelihood of CUSFTAs
implementation are su¢ ciently rapidly reected in stock prices, price reactions contain infor-
mation about changes in future prots and can be used to test heterogeneous rm models.
The key advantage of such an event study approach over traditional ex-post evaluations is
that the number of confounding factors is much more limited. Only factors about which expec-
tations change during my one- to two-day event windows will have the potential to contaminate
the estimates. Secondly, from a conceptual point of view, event studies present an interesting
alternative to ex-post tests of heterogenous rm models. These models essentially make pre-
dictions about changes in future per-period prots brought about by trade liberalizations. To
the extent that expectations about these changes will be reected in stock prices, analyzing
price reactions will be conceptually closer to the modelstheoretical predictions than looking
at realized rm-level variables ex-post.3
CUSFTA is particularly well suited for providing evidence on heterogeneous rm models in
general, and for event study evidence, in particular. First, CUSFTA was a clearly dened policy
experiment in the sense that it was neither introduced in response to a macroeconomic shock nor
part of a larger package of reforms (Treer, 2004). Second, the main instrument of liberalization
tari¤ cuts is easily quantiable and has a direct theoretical counterpart in heterogeous rm
1A few studies have also found productivity gains from exporting (e.g., De Loecker, 2007), or have noted that
exporting and productivity-increasing investments are complementary activities (e.g., Bustos, 2011). But even
in this literature, the consensus is that new and existing exporters are more productive to begin with than rms
which remain non-exporters.
2See Burstein and Cravino (2014) and Breinlich and Cuñat (2013) for the predictions of trade models with
heterogeneous rms with respect to measured productivity, i.e., productivity as measured in the data used by
the empirical studies cited above.
3Looking at stock price reactions also brings additional challenges as compared to traditional ex-post ap-
proaches. By construction, my sample consists of publicly traded rms which are relatively large. The accounting
data available for these rm is also incomplete as far as export status is concerned. A nal concern is that stock
market event studies present a joint test of both the theory in question and the e¢ cient markets hypothesis (e.g.,
Campbell et al., 1997). Below, I present detailed arguments as to why none of these issues is likely to a¤ect my
results qualitatively, although they might make a quantitative interpretation more challenging.
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models. In addition, CUSFTA was a reciprocal agreement and is as such suitable for analyzing
the di¤erential impact of domestic and foreign tari¤s. This distinction is a key element of many
of the more recent heterogeneous rm models such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) or Chaney
(2008). Third, as I will discuss in more detail below, the cross-sectoral variation in tari¤ cuts
was both substantial and largely exogenous, allowing for the implementation of a di¤erence-in-
di¤erences estimation strategy within my event study framework. Finally, and more specically
relevant for an event study, CUSFTA was the main election issue in the Canadian federal election
of November 1988. Both the election itself as well as a number of events in its run-up provide
unanticipated changes in the likelihood of CUSFTAs implementation which is essential for the
successful implementation of an event study.
My analysis proceeds in two steps. I rst show how stock price reactions can be used to test
heterogeneous rm models, and use a simple model of this class based on Chaney (2008) to derive
testable predictions for the remaining sections. I then proceed to a test of these predictions,
using unanticipated changes in the likelihood of CUSFTAs implementation to analyze within-
sector di¤erences in abnormal stock market returns. In practice, my estimation strategy will
compare the stock returns of rms which vary along a number of characteristics. I use rm
size (as measured by sales) in most specications but also look at employment, productivity
and export status. In addition to improving data availability, such a broad-based approach
has several advantages. First, heterogeneous rm models make predictions about stock market
reactions of small vs large and less vs more productive rms, in addition to reactions of new
and existing exporters vs non-exporting rms. As I explain below, using sales (or employment
or productivity) in addition to export status also helps addressing the di¢ culty of identifying
new exporters in the data and provides more direct evidence for the intra-industry reallocation
predicted by models in the tradition of Melitz (2003).
My ndings are broadly supportive of the predictions of heterogeneous rm models. The
election victory of the ruling Progressive Conservatives (a strong supporter of CUSFTA) led to
signicant stock market gains of large relative to small rms (and of more productive relative
to less productive, and exporting relative to non-exporting rms). In contrast, opinion polls in
the run-up to the election showing a substantial lead for the oppositional Liberal Party (who
were opposed to CUSFTA) resulted in the opposite stock market return di¤erences.
In order to address the possibility that a Conservative election victory may have a¤ected
di¤erent types of rms di¤erently through channels other than CUSFTA, I compare between-
rm return di¤erences across industries with di¤erent extents of tari¤ cuts. Consistent with
theoretical predictions, I nd that the relative gains and losses of larger (and more productive
and exporting) rms were indeed signicantly higher in sectors with larger U.S. tari¤cuts. These
results are robust to including a number of control variables such as changes in intermediate
input tari¤s and rmsmultinational status.
As a further check on my results, I also examine stock market reactions to two earlier events
which were directly related to CUSFTA but not the election itself: the reaching of an agreement
on CUSFTA after di¢ cult negotiations between the U.S. and Canada in October 1987; and the
refusal of the Canadian Senate to ratify the agreement in July 1988. I again nd that stock
prices of larger rms increased relative to those of smaller rms in reaction to the rst event,
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and decreased in response to the second event. As before, reactions were stronger in sectors with
higher future U.S. tari¤ cuts. Finally, I also perform placebo checks by looking at stock market
reactions on dates on which no new information about CUSFTA was revealed. Consistent with
theoretical predictions, I do not nd signicant e¤ects in these additional regressions.
My results are less conclusive with respect to the e¤ects of reductions in Canadian import
tari¤s. Most results suggests that larger Canadian rms also gained relative to smaller rms in
response to such tari¤ cuts. However, the corresponding coe¢ cient estimates are generally small
and have the wrong sign for some specications and events. Interestingly, as I discuss below,
these weaker results correspond to less clear-cut theoretical predictions of heterogeneous rm
models with respect to import tari¤ liberalization (as opposed to export tari¤ reductions), in
the sense that the predictions of existing models seem to partially depend on specic modeling
assumptions such as demand and cost structures. Some of my results suggest, however, that
Canadian tari¤ cuts did matter for di¤erential prot responses through other channels, in
particular through reductions in the intermediate input tari¤s industries face.
While my main results are all of a qualitative nature, I also try to provide a sense of the
quantitative importance and plausibility of the estimated return di¤erences. To this end, I
calculate the CUSFTA-induced change in the expected future prots of active rms implied
by my estimates. Based on assumptions about the change in the likelihood of CUSFTAs
implementation brought about by the Conservative election victory, I estimate that CUSFTA
increased the within-industry di¤erence in per-period prots of smaller and larger rms by
around 6%-7% in the most plausible scenarios, and up to 14% under more extreme assumptions.
While stock market event studies are frequently employed in the corporate nance liter-
ature, they have rarely been used to test theories of international trade. Exceptions include
Grossman and Levinsohn (1989), who use stock market returns to provide evidence in favor of
the specic-factors model of trade, and a small number of papers which analyze stock market
reactions to trade policy announcements concerning specic industries, such as the imposition
of antidumping duties (e.g., Hartigan et al., 1986 and 1989; Hughes et al., 1997; Bloningen et
al., 2004).4 To the best of my knowledge, the present paper is the rst to analyze stock market
reactions to a broad-based trade liberalization episode and link the results to recent theories of
international trade. While my focus is on testing models of heterogeneous rms in the tradition
of Melitz (2003), some of my robustness checks also provide complementary evidence to existing
results from ex-post approaches for the e¤ect of reductions in intermediate input tari¤s and the
di¤erential impact of trade liberalization on multinational and domestic rms (see Bloningen
(2005); Amiti and Konings (2007); Topalova and Khandelwal (2011); Halpern et al. (2011)).
The use of cross-sectional variation in tari¤ cuts to implement a di¤erence-in-di¤erences ap-
proach within the event study framework is also novel and substantially increases the potential
for convincing econometric identication. Finally, the present paper seems to be the rst to
attempt a quantication of the di¤erential impact of trade liberalizations on the prots of rms
within an industry, which is the driving force behind subsequent market share reallocations.
4There are also a few studies which look at stock market movements during the Canadian election campaign
from 1988 in di¤erent contexts. Together with the press coverage of the campaign and a number of political
science studies, these inform my choice of events and are cited in more detail in Section 3 below.
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how stock price reactions
can be used to test heterogeneous rm models, and uses a simple model of this class to derive
testable predictions for the remaining sections. Section 3 describes CUSFTA and the specic
events I study in more detail. Section 4 discusses the event study methodology and describes
the data sources used. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Predictions
In this section, I rst explain the link between stock market prices and rm prots. I then
discuss the predictions of heterogeneous rm models with respect to tari¤-cut-induced prot
changes. In Section 2.2, I use a heterogeneous rm model based on Chaney (2008) which is
simple enough to demonstrate the mechanisms at work, yet su¢ ciently exible to accomodate
asymmetric countries and tari¤ barriers, two key features of CUSFTA. Section 2.3 discusses
to what extent these insights carry over to more general settings. The online appendix to
this paper provides analytical results for two popular extensions of Melitz (2003), the original
Chaney (2008) model and the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).5
2.1 Linking Stock Prices to Expected Prots
The standard approach to linking stock prices and expected prots is the dividend discount
model (see Brealey and Myers, 2000). The dividend discount model states that the price of rm
i0s shares at time t equals the net present value of its future stream of dividends per share:
pit =
X1
s=1
E(DIVijIt)
(1 + ei)s
=
E(DIVijIt)
ei
where E(DIVijIt) is the expected value of future per-period dividends per share of rm i, given
information available on date t (It), and ei is the expected return on securities in the same
risk class as rm i. Assuming that rms disburse all prots as dividends, or that prots are
reinvested at an internal rate of return equal to ei, share prices are simply the net present value
of expected future prots per share:6
pit =
X1
s=1
E(ijIt)
(1 + ei)s
=
E(ijIt)
ei
(1)
Now consider the stock price reactions of any two rms i and i0 to an event which changes
expectations about future prots of these rms. Denoting the event-induced stock market
returns by rEi and rEi0 , the return di¤erence between rms i and i
0 is given by:
rE;i   rE;i0 =
E(ijIt+")
E(ijIt)
  E(i
0 jIt+")
E(i0 jIt)
(2)
where It+" is the new information set. What matters for the di¤erence in event-induced stock
market returns is thus the change in expected future prots of rm i relative to rm i0 upon
5The online appendix is available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~hbrein/.
6 It is straightforward to allow for growth in expected prots and dividends, or for positive net present value
projects (see Brealey and Myers, 2000). Note that ei also controls for di¤erences in survival probabilities across
rms, so that the summation is always from s = 1 to innity.
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the arrival of new information (regarding the likelihood of CUSFTAs implementation in the
present case).7 Since models of heterogeneous rms make predictions about these prot changes,
and how they vary across rms with di¤erent sizes, productivity levels, or export status, stock
market returns in response to unanticipated events can be used to implement empirical tests of
this class of models.
Note that for testing the qualitative predictions of heterogeneous rm models, the assump-
tions underlying my derivations can be substantially relaxed. For example, one could allow for
more complex connections between dividends and prots, as long as the positive correlation
between changes in both variables is preserved. Likewise, it is not required that stock prices
fully and immediately reect all relevant information. All that is needed is that new informa-
tion about the likelihood of CUSFTAs implementation is priced in to a statistically detectable
extent within a period of one or two days (the standard length of my event windows). Given
the importance of CUSFTA in the Canadian election campaign of 1988 and for the Canadian
economy more generally, it seems reasonable that at least some market participants reacted
quickly to the Conservativeselection victory and were able to judge CUSFTAs impact on rm
prots, at least in terms of the direction of the change if not its exact magnitude. Note, in
particular, that the extent of tari¤ cuts across sectors had been publicly known even before the
successful conclusion of negotiations in October 1987 (see Section 3 for details).
2.2 Firm-Level Prots and Trade Liberalization
I now turn to a formal discussion of how rm prots change after trade liberalization in a version
of the model by Chaney (2008). Consider a setting with N potentially asymmetric countries.
A representative consumer in each country derives utility from the consumption of goods from
S + 1 sectors. The rst S sectors each produce a continuum of di¤erentiated goods (Qsn) and
the remaining sector provides a single homogenous good (An):
Un =
XS
s=1
ns lnQns +An; Qns =
Z
2sn
qns()
s 1
s d
 s
s 1
(3)
where sn presents the set of available varieties of good Qns, and s > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution between any two varieties in sector s. Associated with Qns is a price index
P 1 sns =
hR
2ns pns()
1 sd
i
, where pns() is the price of variety  in sector s, country n.
Good A is freely traded and I choose its price as the numéraire. With this setup, demand for
individual varieties is qns() = pns ()
 s P s 1ns ns.
I choose parameter values such that all countries produce positive amounts of the numéraire.
Labor is mobile between sectors but immobile across countries. The numéraire sector operates
under perfect competition and with a linear production function. As usual, prot maximization
implies that wages in country n are equal to labor productivity (An), wn = An .
7Note that I assume that discount rates (ei) stay constant in the derivation of (2). As an approximation, (2)
also holds if the ei change by the same factor for both rms. Likewise, in the empirical analysis I will require
that discount rates are either constant or that their changes are uncorrelated with the rm characteristic (sales,
export status etc.) along which I compare rms stock return reactions to CUSFTA-related events. I discuss
issues related to discount rates in more detail in my robustness checks in Section 5.2. There, I also provide
evidence that changes in discount rates in response to my events are unlikely to substantially bias my results.
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The di¤erentiated goods are produced using labor as the only factor of production. Firms
vary in productivity levels, , and have unit labor requirements of l () = q=. In order to
ship goods from country i to country j, rms in sector s also have to pay an (ad-valorem)
tari¤ of tsij . In accordance with my empirical analysis, I focus on tari¤s here and abstract from
additional trade costs. However, in the online appendix I show that all of the following results
go through when I use standard iceberg-type trade costs. Finally, a rm in country i selling
goods to country j in sector s has to pay a xed cost of fsij in terms of the numéraire. Thus,
rm prots from selling to market j are sij (q; ) =

1  tsij

psijq   wi q   f
s
ij .
Each rm in the di¤erentiated goods sectors is a monopolist for the variety it produces and
sets market-specic prices at pij =  1
wi
(1 tij) . There are a large number (Mns) of potential
entrants in each country and sector which have to decide in which of the N countries to sell.
Productivity levels  are known to rms before entry. In equilibrium, only rms which can
earn non-negative prots in a given market will serve that market, leading to market-specic
productivity cuto¤s, ij;s. Finally, I assume that rm productivity  in country n, sector s, is
Pareto distributed with density vns() = as (kns)
as  (as+1), where kns > 0, as > s   1 and
  kns. For notational ease, I focus on a single sector and drop the subscript s from now on.
Under the above assumptions I obtain a solution for the entry cuto¤s ij in each sector as:
ij = A

wi (1  tij) 

 1 (fij)
1
 1 
  1
a
j


 X
n
(1  tnj)
a ( 1)
 1 (wn)
 aMnk
a
nf
 a 1
 1
nj
!1=a
(4)
where A collects constant terms. If a rm is active in market j, its prots there can be expressed
as a function of the relevant entry cuto¤. Total prots of a rm with productivity  are:
i () =
X
n
in () = 
 1
X
n
max
h
(in)
1    1 
i
fin; 0

(5)
I look at the impact of tari¤ reductions between Canada (i) and the United States (j) on
Canadian rmsprots. I do so separately for Canadian and U.S. tari¤s, in analogy to the
empirical analysis below which tries to disentangle the e¤ect of reductions in each of these two
tari¤s. In the model, tari¤ cuts correspond to a lowering of tij (U.S. import tari¤) and tji
(Canadian import tari¤). Because of quasi-linear preferences and the assumption of a xed
number of incumbents, third market prots of Canadian rms will not be a¤ected by changes
in U.S. or Canadian import tari¤s (see expression (4)). Thus, it is su¢ cient to analyze changes
in domestic prots (ii) and in prots from exports to the U.S. (ij).8
I rst look at the e¤ect of lower U.S. tari¤s. For rms which export both before and after
liberalization, I have:
X

; tij ; t
0
ij

X ()
=
 1fij


01 
ij   
1 
ij

X ()
> 0
8 In the following, I assume parameter values such that in > 

ii for all n. Thus, all active rms serve the
domestic market but only the more productive rms export (which is the empirically relevant case).
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where tij denotes the initial tari¤ and t0ij the new (lower) tari¤. The relative prot change
for existing exporters is positive because from (4), the domestic cuto¤ is not a¤ected and the
U.S. export cuto¤ falls, 
0
ij < 

ij . For rms which export neither before nor after the tari¤
reduction, U.S. prots (ij) are zero and the percentage change in prots after a lowering of
U.S. tari¤s is also zero because the domestic cuto¤ is not a¤ected:
DOM

; tij ; t
0
ij

DOM ()
=
 1fii


01 
ii   
1 
ii

DOM ()
= 0
Finally, for rms which start exporting only after U.S. tari¤s have been reduced, we have:
S

; tij ; t
0
ij

S ()
=


0
ij
1 
 1fij   fij
S ()
> 0
Thus, existing and new exporters observe stronger relative prot increases than purely domestic
rms. From (2), we should thus observe a positive di¤erence in stock market returns between
new and existing exporters and non-exporters upon the arrival of new information making an
implementation of CUSFTA more likely.9
Next, consider a reduction in Canadian tari¤s from tji to t0ji. From (4), the export cuto¤
ij will not be a¤ected whereas the domestic entry cuto¤ 

ii will rise (
0
ii > 

ii). Thus, only
domestic prots will be a¤ected. The implied change in total prots of exporting rms will be:
X

; tji; t
0
ji

X ()
=
 1fii


01 
ii   
1 
ii

X ()
< 0
For non-exporters which continue to serve the Canadian market we have:
DOM

; tji; t
0
ji

DOM ()
=
 1fii


01 
ii   
1 
ii

DOM ()
<
X

;  ji; 
0
ji

X ()
So both exporters and non-exporters lose but losses in percentage terms are more severe for
non-exporters. Intuitively, the part of exporterstotal prot derived from the U.S. market is not
a¤ected by Canadian tari¤ cuts, so that the relative decline in total prots is smaller. Secondly,
exporters are more productive and spread the market-specic xed costs over a larger amount
of sales. The percentage decline in domestic prots alone will thus also be smaller.
Finally, the least productive Canadian rms will exit the domestic market:
EXIT

; tji; t
0
ji

EXIT ()
=
0 
 
1 ii 
 1fii   fii

EXIT ()
=  1 <
DOM

; tji; t
0
ji

DOM ()
Thus, Canadian tari¤ reductions will reduce prots of all Canadian rms but exporters will be
9Note that it is not possible to unambiguously rank the relative prot changes of existing exporters and
new exporters. While the most productive new exporter will have a higher percentage prot change than all
existing exporters, the least productive new entrant will have a relative change lower than that of all rms already
exporting. In contrast, absolute prot increases (i.e.,  rather than =) are smallest for the least productive
new exporter and increase monotonically with productivity, yielding an unambiguous ranking. In my robustness
checks in Section 5.2, I show that with additional assumptions this result can be used to also make predictions
about absolute changes in stock prices (as opposed to percentage changes).
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less a¤ected than both continuing and exiting domestic rms. We should thus observe a positive
di¤erence in stock market returns between exporters and non-exporters upon the arrival of new
information making an implementation of CUSFTA more likely.
So far, the discussion of prot changes has been in terms of present or future export status.
But note that in the above model, the only rm-specic characteristic which determines a
rms export status is (labor) productivity. In addition, rm sales are directly proportional
to productivity. This implies that in the data, we should observe di¤erences in stock market
returns across less and more productive, and smaller and larger rms, in addition to return
di¤erences between new and existing exporters, and non-exporting rms.
Using sales or productivity as the rm characteristic of interest also has the advantage that
it provides more direct evidence on the reallocation mechanisms stipulated by models in the
tradition of Melitz (2003). To see this, note that a model in which export status is exogenously
given, or at least unrelated to rm size or productivity, would also predict that exporters should
gain relative to non-exporters in reaction to U.S. tari¤ cuts. It would not, however, predict the
ensuing productivity enhancing market share reallocation which is key to Melitz-type models.
It would also not predict that more productive or larger rms gain relative to less productive
or smaller rms. As such, relying on rm size or productivity allows for a more direct empirical
test than relying on export status alone.10
2.3 Discussion
To what extent do these results carry over to alternative modeling frameworks? Chaney (2008)
introduces income e¤ects in an otherwise identical model by letting his utility function take a
Cobb-Douglas form. This changes the magnitude of the prot responses but leaves the qualita-
tive predictions of the previous section intact, as I demonstrate in the online appendix.
Another simplifying assumption of my baseline model is that wages are xed which rules out
factor market interactions. In contrast, such interactions are crucial for the results in Melitz
(2003). While tari¤s (or more generally, variable trade costs) are assumed to be symmetric
in his model, the general intuition is clear. Lower foreign tari¤s lead exporters to expand,
putting upward pressure on domestic wages. Non-exporters thus face higher input costs but
do not benet from increased foreign markets access. In my context, U.S. tari¤ cuts would
thus increase the prots of existing and new exporters relative to non-exporters (and of large
vs small rms), similar to my baseline predictions.
A third simplication which is more critical for the previous results, especially with respect
to domestic tari¤ reductions, is the assumption of a xed number of potential entrants. For
example, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) present a version of their model with long-run entry in
which the expected prots of new entrants are reduced to zero. If the discounting of future
prots is low, the resulting equilibrium predictions of such a long-runmodel for the prots of
existing rms might be more relevant for stock price reactions then the predictions of short-run
10Another problem with relying on export status is that it is hard in practice to distinguish between new
exporters which started exporting because of U.S. tari¤ cuts and rms which took up exporting for other reasons
(only the former conceptionally belong to the same group as existing exporters). See Section 4 for details.
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models such as Chaney (2008) which abstract from free entry.11
As I show in the online appendix, this does not matter for U.S. tari¤s reductions because the
short-runand long-runpredictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) are qualitatively identical.
As in my baseline model, prots of new and existing exporters are predicted to increase relative
to non-exporters. In contrast, allowing for long-run entry makes a qualitative di¤erence to
predictions with respect to domestic (Canadian) tari¤ reductions. Such reductions now lead
to less entry, increasing the prots of the remaining rms. At the same time, better access
to the Canadian market leads to increased entry of U.S. rms which also serve their domestic
market. This makes it more di¢ cult for Canadian exporters to sell there, lowering prots from
exporting. The assumption of linear demand in Melitz and Ottaviano implies that the smaller
and less productive non-exporters will see a stronger percentage increase in their domestic
prots than exporters. They also do not su¤er a reduction of their export prots. Thus, in
the free-entry version of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Canadian tari¤ reductions favor those
non-exporters in Canada which do not exit the market entirely (see the online appendix).12
To summarize, my discussion suggests that the predictions of my simple Chaney-type model
with respect to export (i.e., U.S.) tari¤ reductions carry over to a range of heterogeneous rm
models. In contrast, the relative e¤ect of import (i.e., Canadian) tari¤ reductions on rms
of di¤erent sizes and export status appears to be less robust, and might well be di¤erent in
more general frameworks than the one presented here. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to
place more emphasis on the results with respect to U.S. tari¤ cuts in the subsequent empirical
analysis, although of course the estimated impact of Canadian tari¤ cuts might still be useful
in discriminating between di¤erent versions of heterogeneous rm models.13
3 Description of Events
The Canadian federal election on 21 November 1988 provides a sharply dened event which can
be exploited for event study evidence.14 CUSFTA was extremely contentious among the main
11Formally and using the same notation as in (1), pit =
PT
s=1
E(srjIt)
(1+ei)
s +
P1
s=T+1
E(lrjIt)
(1+ei)
s =
E(srjIt)((1+ei)T 1)
(1+ei)
T ei
+ E(lrjIt)
(1+ei)
T ei
where sr and lr denote per-period prots in the short- and long-run. For
xed T with 1  T < 1, as ei ! 1 the short-run share of discounted prots in total discounted prots
converges towards one. Likewise, as ei ! 0, the share of short-run prots in total discounted prots goes to zero.
12More genereally, the result that exporters see their domestic prots fall by relatively less than non-exporters
in response to import tari¤ reductions seems to be at least in part due to specic assumptions about demand and
cost structures. In my baseline model, it is the presence of xed costs which causes the relatively smaller fall of
domestic prots for larger and more productive rms, and in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) it is the assumption of
linear demand. While the existing literature has not yet explored this issue, one could imagine a demand curve
with more curvature than CES. This would imply a stronger percentage reaction in domestic prots for the more
productive exporters and might reverse some of the above results. (With CES and in the absence of xed cost,
relative domestic prot changes are identical for rms with di¤erent levels of productivity.)
13Given their prominence in the literature, I focus on the evaluation of static heterogenous rm models with
exogenously given rm productivity () throughout this paper. An interesting extension for future work would
be to allow for interactions between stock prices and rm-level decisions. These could arise, for example, because
stock prices impact on the availability of external nance and thus possibly on rmsinvestment decisions. See
Burstein and Melitz (2011) for an exhaustive discussion of the properties of dynamic trade models with investment
in innovation.
14The following discussion and selection of events is based on coverage in the Canadian press of the election
campaign and the U.S.-Canadian negotiations regarding CUSFTA, Morck et al. (1998), Frizzell et al. (1989),
Brander (1991), Johnston et al. (1992), and Thompson (1993). More specic citations follow below.
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Canadian political parties, with the governing Progressive Conservatives (who had negotiated
the agreement) in favor, and broad sections of the main opposition parties (the Liberals and
the New Democratic Party) opposed. Indeed, the Liberal Partys leader, John Turner, publicly
vowed as late as October 1988 that he would dismantle CUSFTA in case of an election victory.
The fate of CUSFTA thus depended on the election outcome on November 21.
At the same time, CUSFTA received an unprecedented amount of attention in the election
campaign and was the single-most important issue in votersminds. In opinion polls taken in
the month before the election, over 80% of the electorate cite CUSFTA as the most important
election issue (Frizzell et al., 1989). One would thus expect that market participants were aware
of the key aspects of CUSFTA (including the extent of tari¤ cuts), and of the consequences a
Conservative or Liberal election victory would have for CUSFTAs implementation.
Finally, the election outcome was highly uncertain. Given the particularities of the Canadian
electoral system, the Conservatives needed a vote share of slightly more than 40% to obtain a
parliamentary majority (Johnston et al., 1992). As late as the week before the vote on November
21, however, opinion polls showed Liberals and Conservatives head-to-head at 35% of the vote
each.15 Such an outcome would have given Liberals and New Democrats a parliamentary
majority and would have meant that CUSFTA would not be ratied. The turning point came
only with the publication of three nationwide polls on November 19, the Saturday before the
election. All three polls put the Conservatives at over 40% and clearly ahead of the Liberals.
These predictions proved to be almost exactly correct, and on November 21 the Conservatives
won the election with 43% of the popular vote, compared to 32% for the Liberal Party and 20%
for the New Democrats.
Besides the election itself, I will look at three earlier events which also changed the likelihood
of CUFTAs implementation. The second event is the reaching of an agreement on CUSFTA
between Canada and the U.S. on Saturday, 3 October 1987.16 Negotiations had been di¢ cult
and were only brought to a successful conclusion hours before the deadline on October 3 imposed
by the U.S. Congressfast-track procedure. Thus, the reaching of an agreement was to some
extent unexpected. At the same time, the last-minute negotiations were concerned with details
of CUSFTAs dispute-settlement procedure, while the remaining key elements of the agreement
(including the extent and timing of the tari¤ reductions) had already been in place. So market
participants were probably aware of most of its consequences at this point and the relevant news
when markets opened on October 5 was simply that an agreement had been reached, and not
about the exact nature of tari¤ cuts.
The third event is again related to CUSFTAs ratication. On the morning of 20 July 1988,
John Turner, the Liberal Partys leader, announced at a press conference that he had instructed
the Liberal majority in the Senate to block the ratication of CUSFTA until a general election,
which was expected to be called within the next months. This was seen by many as a move
to revive the electoral prospects of his party which was trailing in the opinion polls (Johnston
et al., 1992). By delaying the ratication, John Turner e¤ectively turned the general election
15All opinion polls quoted in this section are taken from Frizzell et al. (1989).
16The information in this paragraph is based on the extensive coverage of the negotations in the Canadian
newspaper The Globe and Mail from 5 October 1987. Also see Thompson (1993).
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into a referendum on CUSFTA. This move destroyed any hopes for a quick ratication and
even raised the possibility that CUSFTA might not be implemented at all, given the hostility
of Liberals and New Democrats to the agreement.
Finally, I also use a particularly dramatic change in opinion polls in the run-up to the
election. After it had become clear that the Senate would not ratify CUSFTA, prime minister
Brian Mulroney called a general election on October 1. In the initial phase of the election
campaign, the Conservatives had a clear lead in the opinion polls. An important turning point
came with the only two televised debates between the main partiesleaders on October 24 and
25. Against expectations, John Turner emerged as the clear winner from these debates and
electoral fortunes started to change. The most dramatic and unexpected event in this phase of
the campaign was the publication of a Gallup poll on the morning of November 7, putting the
Liberals at 43% of the vote, compared to only 31% for the Conservatives and 22% for the New
Democrats. While opinion polls had been gradually shifting since the debates, this presented a
massive increase in support for John Turners party and for the rst time made a Liberal victory
look likely (Brander (1991); Frizzell et al. (1989)). In response, the Conservatives undertook
a radical overhaul of their campaign strategy, enabling them to catch up in the opinion polls
again (Frizzell et al., 1989). However, it was only with the above-mentioned publication of three
nationwide opinion polls on November 19 that it became clear that the Conservatives would
win.
To summarize, my principal event is the election day (November 21) and the rst trading
day after the election (November 22). While markets could only react to the election results
on November 22, the publication of the opinion polls on November 19 had already made a
Conservative victory very likely. The remaining three events are less important shifts in the
likelihood of CUSFTAs implementation but are useful as robustness checks. In particular,
events three and four imply a decrease in the likelihood of ratication and should lead to
opposite stock market reactions from the election event. Events two and three present changes
in the probability of CUSFTAs implementation which are unrelated to the election outcome.
They will provide additional evidence that market reactions were indeed due to CUSFTA rather
than a Conservative election victory.
4 Methodology, Data and Descriptive Statistics
Methodology. Testing the theoretical predictions from Section 2 requires a model of nor-
mal stock returns which adjusts for di¤erences in risk and other characteristics of stocks. A
standard approach in the literature is to use the so-called market model which relates the return
on security i at time t to a stock-specic constant and the return on the market portfolio, Rmt
(Campbell et al., 1989; Binder, 1998):
rit = i + iRmt + "it (6)
This approach controls for di¤erences in average returns across stocks (i), a stocks (non-
diversiable) risk as measured by i and movements in the market portfolio. The error term
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"it captures abnormalreturns which in the present context could be caused by the arrival of
unexpected news about the implementation of CUSFTA.17
A straightforward way to measure abnormal returns related to CUSFTA is to directly model
the error term in equation (6) according to the theoretical discussion from Section 2:
rit = i + iRmt +
XE
e=1
det (dj + 1edix) + it (7)
where the det are a set of dummy variables, each taking a value of one for one particular day
during event window E. The dj are industry xed e¤ects, and dix is a variable classifying rms
into groups in accordance with the predictions from Section 2. For example, in my baseline
model in Section 2.2, it is related to the productivity level S separating non-exporters from
rms which start exporting in response to U.S. tari¤ cuts, and to the productivity level X
separating exporter and non-exporters in the case of Canadian tari¤ cuts. The theoretical
prediction is that rms with productivity below these levels should lose relative to rms with
productivity levels above. As discussed, these levels are not directly observable in the data
and I will use various proxies for dix based on rm sales, employment, productivity and export
status (see below for details).
Equation (7) is estimated on a sample containing both pre-event and event data (see below
for details). As discussed by Binder (1998), and as I show in robustness checks reported in the
online appendix, this one-step approach is equivalent to the traditional two-step procedure of
rst estimating the market model parameters i and i on pre-event data only (the so-called
estimation period), computing abnormal returns as prediction errors of the market model during
the event period, and then regressing these abnormal returns on industry xed e¤ects and the
proxy for dix. A key advantage of (7) is that the modeling of heteroscedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence in abnormal returns is more straightforward and can be done via an
appropriate clustering of standard errors in a standard OLS regression framework.18
The coe¢ cient estimate ̂1e represents the average abnormal return di¤erence for rms with
di¤erent values for dix on event day e, after controlling for industry xed e¤ects. If an event
takes place over more than one day (as is the case for my main election event), I calculate
cumulative average abnormal return di¤erences (CAARs), dened as CAARE =
XE
e=1
̂1e.
As already discussed, one concern with (7) is that my main event (the general election) not
only changed the likelihood of CUSFTAs implementation but also expectations about other
policies. For example, a conservative victory might have been seen as advantageous for rms
which are larger, more productive, or are present or likely future exporters. I thus make use of
the sectoral variation in tari¤ cuts implemented under CUSFTA by estimating:
17This is the part of stock returns I focused on in Section 2. Note that the dividend discount model can easily
be extended to generate a normalrate of return in addition to event-induced (abnormal) returns by introducing
expected dividend/prot growth.
18Throughout this paper, I cluster standard errors by trading day (there are approximately 300 trading days in
my estimation and event periods, depending on the particular specication and event in question). This allows
for both heteroscedasticity and arbitrary cross-sectional dependence in the residual it for a given day, and 
consistent with the maintained assumption of market e¢ ciency restricts intertemporal correlations to zero.
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rit = i + iRmt +
XE
e=1
det (dj + 1edix + 2edixdtCAN;j + 3edixdtUS;j) + it (8)
where dtCAN;j and dtUS;j denote Canadian and U.S. tari¤ cuts in industry j between 1988 and
1996, respectively.19 Recall from the earlier discussion that larger, more productive rms should
benet more from higher U.S. tari¤ cuts than smaller, less productive rms (i.e., 3e < 0, given
that higher reductions imply a more negative dt). In the model from Section 2.2 this is also
true for Canadian tari¤ cuts (i.e., 2e is also expected to be negative), although I noted that
this prediction might not survive in other heterogeneous rm models.
Introducing variation in tari¤ cuts into the modeling of abnormal returns means I only
require the weaker identifying assumption that the di¤erential impact of a Conservative victory
on rms of di¤erent sizes, productivity levels and export status does not vary systematically with
the extent of U.S. or Canadian tari¤ cuts. If Conservative policies simply beneted larger rms
more than smaller rms, this e¤ect will be captured in the dix dummies. Likewise, identication
is still assured if a Conservative election win beneted certain sectors more than others but not
di¤erentially so across rms of di¤erent sizes, productivity and export status any such e¤ect
will be captured by the industry xed e¤ects in (8).20
Data. Estimation of (7) and (8) requires data on daily returns on individual stocks and the
market portfolio, the tari¤ cuts implemented under CUSFTA, and information about rm size,
productivity and export status. For comparability with the existing literature and because of
the availability of information on tari¤ cuts, I focus my analysis on rms in the manufacturing
sector. Because of the tradability of its output, this is also the sector most directly a¤ected by
CUSFTA and the one that corresponds best to the theoretical model from Section 2.
I use daily stock returns from Datastream for all Canadian manufacturing rms listed on
one or several Canadian or U.S. stock exchanges for which I have at least one year of return
data prior to the event studied. This is the standard length in the event study literature for the
pre-event window used to estimate the market models parameters (see Binder (1998)). I also
follow a large part of the literature by using the value-weighted CRSP portfolio as a proxy for
the market portfolio.21
Tari¤ data are from Treer (2004) who provides U.S. and Canadian ad-valorem tari¤s for
manufacturing industries at the four-digit level of the Canadian Standard Industrial Classication
191996 is the last year for which I have tari¤ data. Manufacturing tari¤s were phased out linearly over a period
of up to ten years under CUSFTA and were close to zero in 1996 (see Treer, 2004).
20Treer (2004) and other authors have also argued that tari¤ cuts under CUSFTA were exogenous. CUSFTA
was a clearly dened policy experiment in the sense that it was neither introduced in response to a macroeconomic
shock nor part of a larger package of reforms. It was also a free trade agreement under which tari¤s were reduced
to zero. This meant that the extent of tari¤ cuts was exclusively determined by the initial level of tari¤s in each
sector, so that there was no scope for policymakers to retain tari¤s for sectors in need of continued protection.
Indeed, Treer (2004) experiments with di¤erent instrumental variable strategies and, using the same tari¤ data
as in this paper, nds no evidence for endogeneity problems in the corresponding Hausman tests.
21 I obtain CRSP portfolio returns from the Wharton Research Data Services (wrds.wharton.upenn.edu). The
CRSP portfolio should be less susceptible to endogeneity concerns, given that the rms in my sample represent
a large share of the overall market capitalization in purely Canadian-based portfolios such as the S&P/TSX
Composite Index. Also note that CRSP contains a number of Canadian rms quoted on U.S. stock exchanges
(but which only account for a small fraction of overall U.S. market capitalization).
14
of 1980. I map these tari¤s into the industry classication used by Datastream (the Industry
Classication Benchmark, ICB) which sorts manufacturing rms into 20 broad industries.22
Among the required rm-level variables, data availability is best for rm sales, followed
by (labor) productivity and information on export status. As discussed, using rm size (and
productivity) also has the advantage of providing more direct evidence on the reallocation
mechanism highlighted by models such as Melitz (2003), and helps addressing the di¢ culty of
identifying new exporters in the data. To illustrate this last point, recall from Section 2 that
rms which start exporting in response to U.S. tari¤ reductions belong conceptually to the
same group of rms as exporters both observe prot increases relative to rms which never
export. In the present case, new exporters accounted for a large fraction of all exporters. For
example, Baldwin and Gu (2003) report that the fraction of exporters among manufacturing
rms increased by almost 70% during the implementation period of CUSFTA. On the other
hand, it is impossible to know whether all of these rms started exporting because of CUSFTA
or would have taken up exporting anyway. Thus, focusing on actual export status risks selecting
an inappropriate mix of rms for treatment and control groups.
In my baseline specication, I thus proxy the key regressor dix in (7) and (8) by the log of
the value of a rms sales in 1988. Using a continuous measure avoids taking a stance on the
exact cuto¤ value of sales which divides rms in an industry into winnersand losers from
trade liberalization. The use of log sales also facilitates the inclusion of a number of binary
control variables in later robustness checks which are often highly correlated with rm sales
(such as multinational status). In extensive robustness checks in Section 5.2, I compare my
baseline results with a number of alternative measures for dix, including employment, labor
productivity, and information on actual actual export status. In practice, these di¤erent mea-
sures of rm heterogeneity yield qualitatively very similar results to my baseline specication.
This is probably not surprising, given that the strong positive correlation between rm size (as
measured by sales or employment), productivity and export status is one of the most robust
empirical ndings in the literature on exporter premia (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999).
Data on rm sales, employment, labor productivity and exports are also from Datastream. I
complement this information with data from Compustat North America whenever Datastream
has missing values. This yields a sample of 247 publicly traded Canadian companies with
primary activities in manufacturing for which I have information on sales and stock prices.
When using my alternative measures for dix, I have to rely on a smaller sample of 210 rms for
employment and labor productivity, and on a sample of 54 rms for export status information.
Descriptive Statistics and Figures. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the number
of rms, rm sales and tari¤ reductions by industry. I note two main points. First, tari¤ cuts
show substantial sectoral variation despite the relatively aggregate industry classication used
here (columns 6-7). Canadian tari¤ cuts range from sectors which basically enjoyed free trade
22See Table 3 for a list of these industries. I use detailed descriptions of individual industries obtained from
Datastream and Statistics Canada to construct a mapping from Treers 213 Canadian Standard Industrial
Classication (CANSIC) industries to the 20 ICB industries used in this paper. This mapping was unique in
90% of cases, in the sense that each CANSIC industry could be mapped into one ICB industry only. I aggregate
the tari¤ data to the ICB level by taking weighted averages across all CANSIC categories mapping into an ICB
industry, using 1988 output shares of CANSIC industries as weights. Output data are also from Treer (2004).
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before CUSFTA to over 25% for Beverages. U.S. tari¤ cuts are lower on average but still
show strong sectoral di¤erences, with tari¤ cuts between 0% and close to 10%.
Second, my focus on publicly traded rms means that my sample is biased towards larger
manufacturing rms (see columns 3-5). This size bias is of course an unavoidable feature of
using stock market data for testing economic theories. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe
that the size variation in my data will be informative about between-rm di¤erences within
industries.23 First, there is a strong variation in sales within industries, ranging from small start-
ups with sales of less than a million Canadian dollars to big corporations with several billion
dollars in turnover. This somewhat alleviates the concern that my sample is unrepresentative
of smaller rms. Second, the export incidence among Canadian manufacturing rms was much
lower in 1988 than nowadays, implying a substantial number of non-exporters even among larger
manufacturing rms.24 Third, and most importantly, the most probable e¤ect of any remaining
sample bias will be to make it less likely to observe statistically signicant di¤erences in stock
market returns between small and large rms in response to news about CUSFTA. To see this,
note that the sample bias towards larger rms implies that even the smaller rms in my sample
are relatively large compared to the average Canadian manufacturing rm. Thus, given the
well-known positive correlation between rm size and export status, it seems likely that the
small(er) rms included in my sample are closer to becoming exporters in the future and should
benet more from trade liberalization than the small rms excluded from my sample. As a
consequence, my results will tend to underestimate the true di¤erential impact of tari¤ cuts on
large vs small rms. But given that below I do nd statistically signicantly higher returns for
larger rms compared to smaller rms within the same industry (at least in the case of U.S.
tari¤ cuts), none of my qualitative conclusions in the following should be a¤ected by the specic
sample composition that arises from focusing on publicly traded rms.
Figure 1 takes a closer look at the data by visualizing the di¤erence-in-di¤erences identi-
cation strategy embodied in my key specication, equation (8). I focus on my main event, the
general election on November 21. However, to fully appreciate the high degree of uncertainty
surrounding the election outcome, it is useful to look at a slightly longer window, starting a
week before the televised debates between the main partiesleaders on October 24 and 25. For
this period, I plot cumulative average return (CAR) di¤erences between large and small rms,
dened here simply as rms with sales above and below the 50th percentile in each industry,
respectively.25 I plot CAR di¤erences for two groups of rms. Those belonging to the 50% of
23Within-industry size variation is the type of variation relevant for my comparison of stock returns of di¤erent
types of rms while controlling for industry xed e¤ects. But note that in terms of overall economic activity, my
sample is also quite representative of Canadian manufacturing, with rms in my sample accounting for C$186
billion or approximately two thirds of total Canadian manufacturing sales in 1988.
24Baldwin and Gu (2003, Table 1) report that in 1984, the last year for which they have data before the
implementation of CUSFTA in 1989, only 14% of manufacturing plants exported. This rises to 31% when
looking at plants surveyed for the Annual Surveys of Manufactures (ASM) which are substantially larger than
the average Canadian manufacturing plant and thus correspond more closely to my sample of publicly traded
rms. As mentioned above, I only observe export status for around 20% of my rms. But for the 54 rm for
which I observe export status, the fraction of non-exporters is still 30%.
25The cumulative average return of a group of stocks G between t1 and t2 is dened as CARt1t2 =
Xt2
s=t1
1
NG
X
iG
ris, where ris is the return of stock i at time s and NG is the number of stocks in group G. The
di¤erence in CARs between exporters and non-exporters in high tari¤ cut industries, for example, is then simply
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industries with the highest U.S. tari¤ cuts implemented under CUSFTA, and those with the
50% lowest tari¤ cuts.26 CAR di¤erences are normalized to zero for both groups one week
before the televised debates on October 24 and 25.
The gure clearly shows a sharp divergence in the CAR di¤erences between high- and low-
tari¤ cut industries in the aftermath of the debates, as the Liberal Partys standing in the polls
improved. This divergence is particularly dramatic on the day of the publication of the Gallup
poll, November 7. Also visible in the graph is the stabilization in CAR di¤erences between large
and small rms, and between high- and low-tari¤ cut industries, as the Conservatives caught up
in the polls again. (The week beginning November 14 brought a couple of opinion polls showing
the parties head-to-head.) Finally, the di¤erence between high- and low-tari¤ cut industries
narrows sharply on election day, November 21, and to a lesser extent on November 22. Thus,
this graphic analysis provides some rst suggestive evidence that stock prices reacted to news
about CUSFTA in a way consistent with the predictions of heterogeneous rm models.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
I now turn to the estimation of the baseline equations (7) and (8). Table 2 presents results for
my main event on November 21 and 22. Here and in the following robustness checks (Section
5.2), I focus on the sign of my coe¢ cient estimates and defer a discussion of their magnitude
and economic signicance to Section 5.3.
Column 1 of Table 2 reports results based on specication (7), using log sales as my proxy
for the key regressor dix. The results indicate that larger rms experienced signicantly higher
abnormal returns about 0.3 percentage points per log point of sales. This is consistent with
the predictions of my baseline model from Section 2.2. As already mentioned, this result could
also capture a more positive impact of a Conservative election victory on larger rms.
In column 2, I include the tari¤ interaction terms as in (8). As predicted, the sign on the
U.S. tari¤ interaction is negative and signicant. Thus, larger rms observed stronger positive
abnormal returns in sectors with larger U.S. tari¤ cuts. This is strongly supportive of a Melitz-
type story in which larger rms benet from increased export opportunities.
Larger rms also beneted from higher Canadian tari¤ cuts relative to smaller rms. This
is consistent with my baseline model as well as with Chaney (2008) and the short-runversion
of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). While this e¤ect is highly statistically signicant, its absolute
magnitude is much smaller than the e¤ect of U.S. tari¤ reductions, even after taking into account
that Canadian tari¤ cuts were on average twice as large as U.S. tari¤ cuts (see Table 3).
CARXhigh   CARNXhigh. Using abnormal rather than simple returns yields a similar picture.
26 I focus on U.S. tari¤ cuts since the theoretical predictions are unambiguous here. Graphs using Canadian
tari¤ cuts yield a broadly similar picture.
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5.2 Robustness Checks
I now examine the robustness of my baseline results presented in Table 2. I focus on the most
important robustness checks here, and report additional results in the online appendix.27
Alternative Measures of Firm Heterogeneity I: Sales-Based Measures. I rst exper-
iment with a number of alternative proxies for my key regressor dix. Table 3 shows results for
several indicators which are also based on rm sales but which now take a binary form, classi-
fying a rm as benetting from trade liberalization if its sales exceed a given industry-specic
threshold value.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, I classify rms as large(dix = 1) if their sales are above
the 30th percentile of an industrys sales distribution. This threshold was chosen to match the
fraction of exporters for the subsample of 54 rms for which I observe exports in 1988. Using
this threshold yields qualitatively identical results to my baseline specication. Larger rms
experienced abnormal returns which were 0.9 percentage points higher than those of smaller
rms, with the di¤erence being highly statistically signicant (column 1). In column 2, I include
the tari¤ interaction terms which are again negative and signicant for both U.S. and Canadian
tari¤s. The abnormal return di¤erence between large and small rms increases by 0.9 percentage
points for each percentage point in U.S. tari¤ reductions, and by 0.2 percentage points for each
percentage point in Canadian tari¤ reductions.
The 30th percentile threshold is my preferred binary proxy for dix but I also present results
for cuto¤s based on more extreme assumptions, ranging from the 20th to the 80th percentile
of industry-specic sales distributions. The 20th percentile threshold rule is again derived from
the fraction of exporting rms in the subsample with export information, but this time also
classies rms as exporters if they have positive export sales in either 1988 or in any year of
CUSFTAs implementation period (1989-1997). Implicitly, this assumes that all of these new
exporters entered the export market because of CUSFTA. Since this is a strong assumption,
the 20th percentile threshold should be seen as an upper bound on the true fraction of pre- and
post-CUSFTA exporters. At the other end of the range of the thresholds used in Table 3 is
the 80th percentile cuto¤ (columns 9-10), which classies only 20% of rms as new or existing
exporters. This gure corresponds to the fraction of exporters among Canadian manufacturing
plants in the pre-CUSFTA period reported in Baldwin and Gu (2003). Since most of these
units of production are substantially smaller than the publicly traded rms in my sample, and
since rm and plant size are strongly correlated with present and future export status, the
80th percent threshold clearly represents a lower bound on the number of rms likely to benet
from CUSFTA. Finally, I use information on the fraction of exporters per Canadian industry
published in Statistics Canada (2000) to introduce sectoral variation in the percentile threshold.
27The online appendix presents results for: 1) changes in the length of the event period; 2) using a two-step
estimation procedure where I calculate abnormal returns in a rst step and use them as the dependent variable
in a second step; 3) using Fama-French portfolios in the abnormal returns regressions to control for systematic
return di¤erences across rms related to size; 4) using returns rather than abnormal returns; 5) using log-returns
as the dependent variable; 6) removing outliers and changing the sample composition in di¤erent ways; 7) using
alternative tari¤ measures which only use the part of bilateral U.S. and Canadian tari¤ reductions which exceeds
changes in the tari¤s between these countries and the rest of the world; and 8) realized ex-post changes in prot
margins.
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As discussed above, it is likely that exporting is more common among the rms in my sample.
Thus, I normalize the average fraction of new and existing exporters across industries to equal
30% as in my binary baseline specication, but preserve the sectoral variation present in the
Statistics Canada data. This yields thresholds for dix ranging from the 90th percentile of the
sales distribution in Media to the 5th percentile in Technology Hardware and Equipment (i.e.,
the fraction of rms with dix = 1 varies between 10% and 95%).
The results reported in columns 3-12 are qualitatively similar to my baseline specication
with the exception of the results based on the 20th percentile threshold, where the Canadian
tari¤ interaction is positive (albeit small and only marginally signicant). The magnitude of
the coe¢ cient estimates is also relatively stable across specications, with most estimates in the
range -0.7 to -1.3 for the U.S. tari¤ cut interaction and around -0.05 to -0.20 for the Canadian
tari¤ interaction variable. Clearly, the pattern that larger rms gained relative to smaller rms,
and more so in sectors with higher U.S. tari¤ cuts is robust to a wide range of sales-based proxies
for dix. The results related to Canadian tari¤ reductions also mostly conrm my baseline results,
although the magnitude of the reported e¤ects is again smaller than for U.S. tari¤ cuts.
Alternative Measures of Firm Heterogeneity II: Actual Export Status. In Table 4, I
make use of the more limited information on export sales available in my data. In columns 1-4,
I reestimate equations (7) and (8) for the 54 rms for which I observe exports.28 In columns 1-2,
I set dix = 1 for rms which report positive export sales in 1988. In columns 3 to 4, I set dix = 1
for rms which report positive exports in either 1988 or during at least one year of CUSFTAs
implementation period (1989-1997). As described above, these classications yield exporter
shares of 70% and 80%, respectively. The results for these specications are again qualitatively
similar to before, with exporters experiencing higher abnormal returns than non-exporters, with
the di¤erence being stronger in sectors with larger U.S. tari¤ cuts.
The small size of these two subsamples precludes the use of industry xed e¤ects. Together
with the change in sample structure, this makes a direct comparison of coe¢ cient magnitudes
with Table 3 di¢ cult. I thus reestimate equations (7) and (8) for this smaller sample, excluding
industry xed e¤ects and using the two binary proxies for dix based on sales thresholds at the
20th and 30th percentile. The results in columns 5-8 are very similar to columns 1-4 which use
export-based proxies for dix. Note that in columns 1-4, Canadian tari¤ cuts are now estimated
to have led to lower relative returns of exporters, in contrast to most of the results from Table
2 and 3 (where larger rms gained relative to smaller rms). However, this result is obtained
both when using the export status proxy for dix and when using the binary proxies based on
sales, again with almost identical coe¢ cient magnitudes. Thus, proxies for dix based on sales
and export information yield very similar results. Results using log sales for this smaller sample
are harder to compare quantitatively to the results for export status because of the di¤erent
functional form used. But as seen in columns 9 and 10, results are again qualitatively similar.
28 I only observe the value of total exports, not the value of exports to the United States. However, given that
over 80% of Canadian exports between 1988-1997 went to the U.S., any rm that exported during this period is
very likely to have served the U.S. market.
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Alternative Measures of Firm Heterogeneity III: Employment and Labor Produc-
tivity. I also experiment with proxies for dix based on employment and labor productivity.
For each of these variables, I construct proxies in the same way as for my preferred measures
based on sales. That is, I rst use the log of labor productivity or employment. I then classify
a rm as likely to benet from trade liberalization (dix = 1) if its employment or labor produc-
tivity is higher than the 30th percentile of that rms industry. One downside of using these
additional proxy variables is that information about rm-level employment is only available for
210 rms, implying a 15% reduction in sample size.29 In any case, the results shown in Table
5 are qualitatively similar to my earlier results. The coe¢ cient estimates based on the two
employment proxies are also quantitatively very close to the comparable proxies based on rm
sales. The estimates based on labor productivity are slightly higher with respect to U.S. tari¤
cuts and close to zero and insignicant for Canadian tari¤ cuts.
Event-Induced Changes in Market Model Parameters and Discount Rates. A stan-
dard concern in the event study literature is that the market model parameters (i and i) are
not stable over time but are changed by the event itself. This will lead to biased estimates of
abnormal returns and could also bias my parameters of interest (the 0s in equation 8). This
will be the case if changes in the market model parameters are systematically correlated with
my measures of rm heterogeneity (size, productivity, export status) and/or tari¤ cuts.
Thus, I re-estimate my baseline specication (8) but extend the sample period to the end
of December 1988 and allow the i to change with the election event:
30
rit = i+iRmt+dpost
 
ip + ipRmt

+
XE
e=1
det (dj + 1edix + 2edixdCAN;j + 3edixdUS;j)+it
where dpost is a dummy variable taking the value of one for dates on or after November 21,
1988. Columns 1-2 of Table 6 presents the corresponding results. In column 1, I only allow the
i to change with the event whereas in column 2, the i are allowed to change as well. Results
in column 1 are basically identical to my baseline estimation, while allowing i to vary only
results in minor changes in parameter estimates.
A related concern is that the election event could have changed a stocks expected return
(ei in the notation of Section 2, equation 1) and thus the appropriate discount rate for future
prots, in addition to future prots themselves (E(ijIt)). Indeed, there is a large literature
on the relative importance of cash ow and discount rate news in explaining stock returns (see
Cochrane (2011) and Koijen and van Nieuwerburgh (2011) for recent surveys). While the more
recent literature nds a larger role for cash ows, it still attributes up to 50% of stock price
variation to unexpected changes in discount rates (e.g., Chen, Da and Zhao (2013)). Discount
rate changes around my event dates are of course not directly observable, making it di¢ cult to
29 Information on intermediate input use is only available for a small minority of rms, so that I dene labor
productivity as sales per employee rather than as value added per employee. Likewise, information on capital
stocks and investment is also very incomplete, preventing the use of total factor productivity.
30Here and in the remainder of the paper, I focus on my main specication (8) for the sake of brevity. Results
for specication (7) are available upon request. The general pattern of the omitted results is consistent with the
predictions discussed in Section 2 and the baseline results in Table 2.
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evaluate their role in explaining my results. However, two observations make it likely that they
were not of rst order importance.
First, any changes in discount rates would have to be correlated with my rm performance
measures and tari¤ cuts. That is, discount rate changes would need to impact the return
di¤erences between large and small rms, and the impact would need to be stronger in sectors
with larger tari¤ cuts. This is a much stronger requirement than a simple change in discount
rates in response to my events.
Second, my previous results on changes in stocksmarket model parameters provide some
tentative evidence that changes in discount rates were not quantitatively important in my
setting. To see this, note that the market model provides a natural benchmark for what the
expected rate of return of a stock should be: eit = E (rit) = i + iE (Rmt).
31
In a rst step, I use my estimates for changes in i and i from the previous regresssions to
identify stocks with statistically signicant changes in eit.32 This is the case for only about 15%
of stocks in my sample, indicating that signicant changes in discount rates are not common.
These changes are also essentially uncorrelated with my measures of rm heterogeneity or tari¤
reductions.33 Secondly, I drop all stocks with signicant estimated changes in eit from my
sample, and re-estimate my baseline equation (column 3). Finally, in column 4, I directly
control for the estimated change in eit in my market model regression rather than dropping
stocks.34 Again, the results in these last two columns are very similar to my baseline estimates,
indicating that changes in expected returns are not the main drivers of my earlier results.
Intermediate Input Tari¤s and Multinational Status. In Table 7, I consider two po-
tential alternative explanations for my results. First, tari¤ reductions under CUSFTA might
partially pick up the impact of intermediate input tari¤ reductions. As Amiti and Konings
(2007) have shown for Indonesia, lower tari¤s on imported intermediate inputs can lead to
signicant increases in rm-level productivity. In their sample, these gains were particularly
pronounced among rms importing intermediates directly. In the present case, Canadian tari¤
reductions lowered the costs of inputs imported from the U.S. This should have increased prots
of Canadian rms and potentially more so for importers. If importers are among the largest
rms in each industry (as the empirical literature on rm-level imports suggests), my interac-
tions of tari¤ cuts and rm sales could simply be picking up the e¤ect of cheaper imported
31An explicit and full integration of the trade models and the dividend discount model from Section 2 with an
equilibrium model of asset prices is beyond the scope of this paper. But note that my expression for ei follows
naturally from just such an equilibrium model (the Capital Asset Pricing Model or CAPM). The CAPM states
that eit = rf + i (E(Rmt)   rf ), where rf is the risk-free rate of return, i measures an assets sensitivity to
non-diversiable (or market) risk, and Rmt is the return on the market portfolio. Thus, the market model nests
the CAPM equation as a special case with i = (1  i) rf .
32These are stocks for which the following equality is rejected at the 5% level: i + ip +
 
i + ip

Rmp =
i + iRmb, where Rmb and Rmp are the average pre- and post-election returns on the market portfolio.
33The correlation coe¢ cient between log-sales and the di¤erence in expected returns (eit;post  eit;pre) is 0.061.
The correlation coe¢ cient between log-sales and the percentage change in expected returns (eit;post=eit;pre) is
0.066.
34 In the notation of equation (2), di¤erences in event-induced (or abnormal) returns across rms in the presence
of changes in ei are rE;i   rE;i0 = E(ijIt+")E(ijIt)
eit
eit+"
  E(i0 jIt+")
E(i0 jIt)
ei0t
ei0t+"
. Disregarding second-order terms, this is
approximately equal to

E(ijIt+")
E(ijIt)
  E(i0 jIt+")
E(i0 jIt)

+

eit
eit+"
  ei0t
ei0t+"

. This motivates my inclusion of eit
eit+"
as an
additional regressor in the abnormal return part of (8).
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intermediates.35
To control for this possibility, I rerun my baseline specication but include an additional
interaction term between reductions in Canadian intermediate input tari¤s and log sales. I
construct input tari¤s by using the Canadian input-output matrix together with the information
on Canadian tari¤ reductions used previously. As is standard in the literature (see Amiti and
Konings (2007) or Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)), I construct the input tari¤ for industry
j as the weighted average of the Canadian tari¤s of all industries k supplying this industry.
That is, input_tariffj =
P
k wkj  tariffk, where wkj is the cost share of industry k in the
production of goods in industry j in 1988. I construct input tari¤s for 1988 and 1996 and use
the di¤erence as my measure of intermediate input tari¤ reductions due to CUSFTA.
A second potential omitted variable is multinational status. Given that multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) tend to be among the largest rms in all sectors, my log-sales proxy is likely to
be positively correlated with MNE status. Again, my results might thus pick up a di¤erential
impact of tari¤ reductions on MNEs and non-MNEs. Fortunately, my data contain information
on foreign a¢ liate sales and assets for about 80% of rms in my baseline sample, so that I can
separately identify the impact of rm size (log sales) and MNE status.36
Column 1 in Table 10 shows results controlling for intermediate input tari¤s, column 2
for MNE status, and column 3 includes both control variables jointly. As expected, stronger
reductions in input tari¤s further increase the abnormal return di¤erence between large and
small rms. In contrast, MNE status lowers abnormal returns in sectors with higher tari¤
reductions, although the e¤ect is only statistically and economically signicant for U.S. tari¤
cuts. This is consistent with, for example, a tari¤-jumping motive for foreign direct investment,
in which Canadian MNEs establish U.S. production sites to avoid export duties on their sales
there. As U.S. tari¤s are eliminated, the value of this local presence is diminished.
Finally, note that the results relating to U.S. tari¤ cuts are robust to the inclusion of the
above control variables, and coe¢ cient magnitudes are similar to my baseline specication. In
contrast, the Canadian tari¤ interaction term becomes insignicant or even slighlty positive once
I control for MNE status. This reinforces the impression from the previous robustness checks
that the ndings related to Canadian tari¤ cuts are less robust to changes in the estimation
equation. At the same time, the results show that Canadian tari¤ cuts did have a substantial
impact on stock returns via the implied change in intermediate input tari¤s.37
Placebo Checks. I now turn to settings for which I would not expect to nd signicant
abnormal return di¤erences between large and small rms, nor a strong variation of these
di¤erences across industries with high and low tari¤ cuts. Specically, I estimate specication
35This is particularly true given the positive correlation between the (output) tari¤s used in my regressions and
intermediate input tari¤s. In my sample, the correlation of Canadian intermediate input tari¤s with Canadian
output tari¤s is 28%, and the correlation with U.S. output tari¤s is 47%. See below for how intermediate input
tari¤s were constructed.
36A rm is classied as an MNE if it either reports positive local a¢ liate sales abroad or owns assets outside
of Canada. Using alternative denitions based on either of these two variables yields almost identical results.
37Quantitatively, this impact is similar to that of U.S. tari¤ reductions. For the average rm (log (sales) = 6:64,
 input = 4:7%), reducing intermediate input tari¤s to zero leads to a predicted abnormal return increase of 3.7
percentage points, compared to an increase of 4.9 percentage points for the elimination of U.S. tari¤s.
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(8) for dates between 1 November 1987 and 30 June 1988, a period during which the likelihood
of CUSFTAs implementation did not vary substantially. I repeatedly draw two consecutive
trading dates from this period at random and estimate (8) for these dates. I then calculate
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) based on my estimates of ̂1e, ̂2e and ̂3e for
these random two-day event windows. I repeat this procedure 1,000 times, thus obtaining a
set of 1,000 CAARs estimates comparable to the ones presented in Table 2. I report means,
standard deviations and percentiles of the resulting distributions in Table 8.
In the light of the earlier theoretical discussion, one would not expect rm size to matter
much as a determinant of abnormal returns in this earlier period, both on its own and when
interacted with tari¤ cuts. On the other hand, if my results so far were picking up some
general characteristics of rms or sectors correlated with rm size and tari¤ cuts, one would
expect parameter estimates of the same magnitude as in my baseline results to show up more
frequently than expected from pure sampling variation. For example, if large rms in sectors
with high future U.S. tari¤ cuts systematically experienced above average abnormal returns,
my baseline and additional results might be due to some (unknown) omitted factor. Table 8
shows that this is not the case for the U.S. tari¤ cut interaction. The probability of observing
two-day U.S.-tari¤-related CAARs on randomly chosen dates which are as large or larger than
the magnitudes reported in Table 4 is only about 3%. In contrast, the probability of generating
two-day Canadian tari¤-related CAARs larger than in Table 2 is higher at around 30%. In
both cases, however, I am unable to reject the hypothesis that that the mean of my generated
CAARs is equal to zero (see column 3).
Absolute Price Changes. The model from Section 2 also provides an interesting additional
testable prediction related to absolute price changes which I briey discuss here. Recall that
in response to Canadian tari¤ reductions, domestic Canadian rms were predicted to see a
relatively larger fall in prots than exporters relative to initial prots. However, the absolute
decline in prots (i.e., rather than=) is smallest for the least productive rms and largest
for the most productive ones. So absolute price changes (p rather than p=p) should be more
negative for the more productive exporters than for purely domestic rms.38 In contrast, the
ranking of absolute prot changes of Canadian rms remains unchanged when looking at U.S.
tari¤ reductions. Existing and new exporters see stronger increases than non-exporters, thus
implying that the former should see stronger absolute price increases than the latter.39
I test this additional prediction by using absolute price changes (pt   pt 1) rather than
returns as the dependent variable. Using absolute price changes has of course the signicant
disadvantage that the methodological framework of event studies no longer applies. As a con-
38From (1), pit   pit 1 = e 1i (E(ijIt)  E(ijIt 1)). Since 
 
;  ij ; 
0
ij

=  1fii


01 
ii   1 ii

, and

0
ii > 

ii, prices should decline by more for more productive and thus larger rms. Note, however, that discount
rates ei do not cancel out when looking at absolute price changes, even if they are not changed by the event itself.
So to see stronger absolute price declines for larger rms, I need the additional assumption that di¤erences in ei
are either unrelated to size or at least not su¢ ciently higher for larger rms.
39This again assumes that there are no systematic and su¢ ciently large di¤erences in discount rates (see the
previous footnote). Also note that, in contrast to relative prot changes, the ranking of new and existing exporters
is now unambiguous, with the most productive (and largest) existing exporters experiencing the strongest absolute
prot and price increases (compare footnote 8).
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sequence, it is now unclear which part of price changes are to be classied as normal and
abnormal. The inclusion of stock-specic correlations with the market portfolio also no longer
has a theoretical basis. Thus, I estimate an adhoc variant of (8) of the form:
pit   pit 1 = 0i +
XE
e=1
det
 
d0j + 
0
1edix + 
0
2edixdCAN;j + 
0
3edixdUS;j

+ 0it (9)
In Table 9, I show results for my log-sales proxy as well as for the preferred binary sales
proxy from Section 5.2, which uses the 30th percentile of industry sales as the relevant cuto¤.
Interestingly, the Canadian tari¤ interaction does change sign although it is only signicant
for the binary sales proxy. Also consistent with the models predictions, the coe¢ cient on the
U.S. tari¤ interaction remains positive and highly signicant. Thus, although the theoretical
foundations of these additional results are less robust than that of my baseline specication,
they provide additional support for the predictions of the class of heterogeneous rm models
analyzed here.
Additional Events. I also present results for the three additional events discussed in Section
3. In Table 10, columns 1-2, I focus on the rst trading day after the successful conclusion of
negotiations on October 3, 1987. Similar to the election outcome itself, this event increased the
likelihood of an implementation of CUSFTA. Unlike the election event, however, there are no
concerns here that my results could be driven by the perceived consequences of a Conservative
election victory for policies other than CUSFTA. As before, I nd stronger abnormal returns
of larger relative to smaller rms (column 1). Again, the di¤erence is larger in industries with
higher U.S. tari¤ cuts (column 2). The same is also true for Canadian tari¤ reductions, although
the size of the corresponding coe¢ cient is again an order of magnitude smaller.
In columns 3-4, I look at the e¤ect of John Turners announcement that he had instructed
the Liberal majority in the Canadian Senate to block CUSFTA until after a general election.
In columns 5-6, I focus on the impact of the publication of the Gallup poll on November 7
which predicted a twelve percentage point lead for the Liberal Party. Both events lowered the
likelihood of a ratication of CUSFTA. According to the theoretical predictions, one would
thus expect to see an e¤ect opposite to the rst two events. This is indeed what I nd. Larger
rms experienced lower abnormal returns than smaller rms (columns 3 and 5) and the positive
coe¢ cient estimates on all the U.S. tari¤ interactions indicate that this di¤erence was larger in
sectors in which CUSFTA foresaw higher tari¤ cuts (columns 4 and 6). The coe¢ cients for the
Canadian tari¤ cut interaction are also positive and statistically signicant.
Interestingly, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimates for all three additional events is
smaller than that of the estimates relating to my baseline event, the Conservative election
victory on November 21-22 (see Table 2). This is consistent with the idea that the latter event
represented the most signicant change in CUSFTAs implementation probability, given that
its ratication by the Canadian parliament was far from assured just before the election but
almost certain right after the Conservative victory.
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5.3 Quantication of Results
I now analyze the quantitative importance and plausibility of the estimated abnormal return
di¤erences more closely. I present two sets of gures. First, predicted abnormal returns are
easily computed using a simple transformation of my baseline equation (8):
cariE =XE
e=1
det

d̂j + ̂1edix + ̂2edixdCAN;j + ̂3edixdUS;j

(10)
where cariE denotes the predicted value of the (cumulative) abnormal returns of stock i during
event window E (here, the election victory of the Conservatives on November 21 and 22).
Secondly, I also compute implied prot changes. I do so by using the link between returns
and prots implicit in equation (1), and solving for prot changes as a function of predicted
abnormal returns and ex-ante and ex-post implementation probabilities:
1 +cariE = E (ijIt+")
E (ijIt)
=
probCt+"iC + (1  probCt+")iNC
probCtiC + (1  probCt)iNC
(11)
, (iC   iNC)
iNC
=
cariE
probCt+"   (1 +cariE) probCt
where cariE are the predicted abnormal returns during the election event, iC are per-period
prots after a successful implementation of CUSFTA, and iNC per-period prots without
CUSFTA. It denotes information available at time t, and probCt and probCt+" the probability
of a successful implementation of CUSFTA before and after the Conservative election victory,
respectively. Note that I use E (ijIt) = probCtiC +(1  probCt)iNC in the above derivation.
That is, the expected future protability of rm i is a weighted mean of prots with and
without CUSFTA, where the weights represent the probability of CUSFTAs implementation.
It is this probability which changes with the election (i.e., between time t and t+ "). Note that
I require assumptions about the probability of CUSFTAs implementation prior to and after
the Conservative election victory, and not just about the change in the probability.
Intuitively, the size of the predicted abnormal returns is a function of the net present value
of prots under the free-trade regime and the alternative scenario without tari¤ cuts, as well
as the change in the likelihood of CUSFTAs implementation brought about by the Conserva-
tive election victory (controlling for the ex-ante probability, probCt). If discount rates are not
changed by the election result, the change in the net present value of prots in turn is equal
to the change in per-period prots. Note, however, that linking returns and prots in this way
requires (1) to hold exactly, rather than as an approximation as was required previously (com-
pare the discussion in Section 2.1). Any biases arising from the fact that I am using a sample
of publicly traded (and thus larger) rms will of course also be more relevant here then for the
qualitative ndings presented so far. Thus, the results in this section are best seen as back-of-
the-envelope calculations suitable for judging the quantitative importance and plausibility of
my estimates, rather than as providing information about the structural parameters or results
in standard quantitative trade models.
With these caveats in mind, I turn to an interpretation of my quantitative results. The rst
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line of Table 11 reports the averages of predicted abnormal returns for large and small rms,
respectively, for the election event window. I rst use my preferred binary sales-based proxy for
dix (see Table 3, column 2) to compute abnormal returns, since the 0-1 classication of rms
into large and small used there makes the presentation of results straightforward. According
to these estimates, large rms experienced predicted abnormal returns of 0.9% on average, and
small rms of -0.1%, yielding a di¤erence of one percentage point (see column 1).
As noted before, these predicted abnormal returns are also likely to be inuenced by the
general impact of a Conservative election victory on stock markets, and possibly by a di¤erential
impact across smaller and larger rms (e.g., if the Conservatives were perceived to be pro big
business). To strip out these two types of confounding impacts, columns 2 and 3 present
average predicted abnormal returns based on (10) but disregard industry xed e¤ects (column
2) or industry xed e¤ects and the non-interacted export dummy (dix, column 3) in the return
computation. Focusing on these parts of predicted abnormal returns, which are more closely
linked to the predictions of heterogenous rm models, yields a larger return di¤erence between
large and small rms of 1.1 percentage points (column 2) and 2.7 percentage points (column 3).
Columns 4-6 compute the same statistics but use estimates based on my baseline proxy of dix,
the log of rm sales (see Table 2, column 2). For comparison with the previous binary measure,
I classify all rms as large which have sales above the 30th percentile of their respective industry
(but I do use actual sales values to compute the predicted abnormal returns of individual rms
before taking averages). Results in columns 4-6 are very similar to columns 1-3, with estimated
return di¤erences of one percentage points for the full specication with industry xed e¤ects,
1.1 percentage points for the specication excluding industry xed, and 3.1 percentage points
for the specication excluding both industry xed e¤ects and the level term in log sales.
In lines 2-5 of Table 11, I present results for implied prot changes, using di¤erent sets of
assumptions about ex-ante and ex-post implementation probabilities. Given the strong support
for CUSFTA voiced by the Conservatives and the fact that their representatives had negotiated
the agreement in the rst place, it seems appropriate to set the ex-post implementation prob-
ability to 100% in all scenarios. The implied prot change is thus determined by assumptions
about the ex-ante likelihood of implementation. In line 2, I use a value of 0% which is the
most conservative assumption in the sense of yielding the smallest implied prot changes. The
corresponding results thus provides a useful lower bound for the true prot impact of CUSFTA.
Lines 3-5 make more realistic assumptions about the ex-ante probabilities. As discussed, the
likelihood of a Conservative election victory was estimated by most observers to be not more
than 50% prior to the publication of the opinion polls on November 19. Thus, in lines 3-5 I
choose ex-ante probabilites centered around 50% (30%, 50% and 70%, respectively).
As can be easily veried from (11), implied prot changes are equal to abnormal returns
in the most conservative scenario of a 0%-100% change in the implementation probability of
CUSFTA, and increase for higher ex-ante probabilities. Depending on the specic way of
calculating predicted abnormal returns and the assumptions about ex-ante probabilities, the
average implied di¤erence in prot changes between large and small rms lies between 1 and
10 percentage points for my binary proxy. The corresponding results for my log-sales measure
span a slightly wider range, reaching from one percentage point to close to 14 percentage
26
points in the least conservative scenario. In my view, these magnitudes are clearly economically
signicant but not implausibly large given the substantial e¤ects of CUSFTA on the Canadian
manufacturing sector found previously by authors such as Treer (2004).
6 Conclusions
This paper presented new empirical evidence on key predictions of heterogeneous rm models.
Using the uncertainty surrounding the negotiation and ratication of the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement in 1987 and 1988, I showed that the pattern of abnormal returns of
Canadian manufacturing rms was broadly consistent with the predictions of a class of models
based on Melitz (2003).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Industry # 
Sales 
dCAN dUS 
Median Min Max 
Aerospace & Defense 10 238.7 39.5 1456.4 -2.7% -2.6% 
Automobiles & Parts 6 412.0 113.2 15943.3 -0.4% -0.2% 
Beverages 9 57.1 4.7 4611.0 -26.6% -1.8% 
Chemicals 7 158.0 32.8 1385.4 -5.2% -4.5% 
Construction & Materials 21 206.5 0.7 4715.0 -6.0% -2.9% 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 14 72.3 0.1 1797.7 -3.3% -2.7% 
Food Producers 19 354.5 3.2 3804.0 -4.3% -2.2% 
Forestry & Paper 22 526.1 43.1 5819.1 -3.3% -0.6% 
General Industrials 8 467.5 1.5 6499.8 -7.5% -2.8% 
Healthcare Equipment & Services 4 33.0 0.3 205.9 -4.3% -2.8% 
Household Goods 12 101.8 10.4 450.5 -8.2% -3.0% 
Industrial Engineering 18 97.2 2.7 1737.5 -0.8% -0.4% 
Industrial Metals 24 408.6 0.1 10175.0 -2.8% -2.0% 
Leisure Goods 6 308.9 93.7 1110.5 -4.6% -3.0% 
Media 27 159.2 0.2 4467.9 0.0% 0.0% 
Oil Equipment & Services 20 14.5 0.7 3941.0 -2.3% -1.5% 
Personal Goods 3 157.1 8.7 1217.2 -12.7% -8.7% 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 6 0.9 0.1 156.3 -4.7% -2.3% 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 9 28.5 2.7 6451.3 -1.6% -1.9% 
Tobacco 2 2629.2 413.9 4844.5 -1.4% 0.0% 
Total 247 178.3 0.1 15943.3 -5.1% -2.3% 
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics on the number of firms per industry, firm-level sales (in mill. 
$CND), and average tariff cuts implemented under CUSFTA. See text for details. 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative average returns during the Canadian election campaign of 1988 
 
 
Notes: Figure shows differences in cumulative average returns (CARs) between firms above and below 
the 50th sales percentile in each industry for two groups of industries: the 50% of industries with the 
largest U.S. tariff cuts and the 50% of industries with the smallest U.S. tariff cuts. All CARs are 
normalized to zero on October 17 and calculated at the end of each day (so that the difference 
between CARt and CARt-1 measures the market reaction on day t). See text for details.  
 
Table 2: Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) 
 Return Return 
de * dx 0.003 -0.006 
 (9.936)** (12.661)** 
de * dx * dUS  -0.420 
  (18.832)** 
de * dx * dCAN  -0.015 
  (3.745)** 
Firms 247 247 
Event Window Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 
Length Event Window 2 days 2 days 
Observations Event Window 494 494 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures 
in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered per trading day). The dependent variable is 
daily stock returns. See text for specification details (equations 7 and 8). The independent variables 
shown in the table are event dummies (de) interacted with the log of sales (the proxy for dx), and 
triple interactions between the event dummy, log sales and Canadian tariff cuts (dCAN) or U.S. tariff 
cuts (dUS), respectively. All specifications include industry fixed effects interacted with the event 
dummies. +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Alternative Measures of Firm Heterogeneity I: Sales-Based Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return 
de * dx 0.009 -0.015 0.019 -0.009 0.007 -0.024 0.008 -0.020 0.004 -0.013 0.014 -0.012 
 (7.923)** (8.461)** (12.325)** (3.548)** (6.661)** (12.428)** (8.815)** (14.059)** (4.996)** (12.861)** (11.799)** (7.512)** 
de * dx * dUS  -0.928  -1.792  -1.311  -1.351  -0.755  -1.140 
  (7.991)**  (11.689)**  (13.568)**  (17.165)**  (13.939)**  (14.625)** 
de * dx * dCAN  -0.208  0.084  -0.166  -0.061  -0.065  -0.097 
  (6.784)**  (1.915)+  (6.797)**  (2.639)**  (3.869)**  (3.855)** 
Size cutoff 
>30th 
percent. 
>30th 
percent. 
>20th 
percent. 
>20th 
percent. 
>40th 
percent. 
>40th 
percent. 
>60th 
percent. 
>60th 
percent. 
>80th 
percent. 
>80th 
percent. 
Sectoral 
variation 
Sectoral 
variation 
Firms 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 
Event Window 
Nov.
21-22 
Nov. 
21-22 
Nov.
21-22 
Nov.
21-22 
Nov.
21-22 
Nov.
21-22 
Nov. 
21-22 
Nov.
21-22 
Nov.
21-22 
Nov.
21-22 
Nov.
21-22 
Nov. 
21-22 
Event Window 
Length 
2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 
Observations 
Event Window 
494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered 
per trading day). See Table 2 and text for details (equations 7 and 8 and Section 5.2). +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
  
Table 4: Alternative Measures of Firm Heterogeneity II: Export Status. 
 (1) Return (2) Return (3) Return (4) Return (5) Return (6) Return (7) Return (8) Return (9) Return (10) Return 
de * dx 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.010 0.015 0.013 0.002 0.002 
 (14.266)** (12.098)** (14.726)** (10.993)** (16.220)** (11.151)** (15.854)** (11.511)** (14.798)** (10.639)** 
de * dx * dUS  -0.338  -0.380  -0.386  -0.299  -0.051 
  (8.122)**  (9.551)**  (10.615)**  (8.430)**  (10.062)** 
de * dx * dCAN  0.061  0.064  0.057  0.061  0.009 
  (3.056)**  (4.989)**  (7.814)**  (8.137)**  (9.785)** 
Definition of dx 
Exporter in 
1988 
Exporter in 
1988 
Exporter in 
1988-1997 
Exporter in 
1988-1997 
Sales>30th 
percent. 
Sales>30th 
percent. 
Sales>20th 
percent. 
Sales>20th 
percent. 
log(sales) log(sales) 
Firms 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Event Window Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 
Event Window Length 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 
Observations Event Window 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered 
per trading day). See Table 2 and text for details (equations 7 and 8 and Section 5.2). +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
Table 5: Alternative Measures of Firm Heterogeneity III: Employment and Labor Productivity. 
 (1) Return (2) Return (3) Return (4) Return (5) Return (6) Return (7) Return (8) Return 
de * dx 0.002 -0.008 0.006 -0.019 0.004 -0.010 0.007 -0.015 
 (7.307)** (16.264)** (4.191)** (10.307)** (7.285)** (8.644)** (5.136)** (5.321)** 
de * dx * dUS  -0.461  -0.917  -0.685  -1.475 
  (16.724)**  (6.511)**  (11.130)**  (9.364)** 
de * dx * dCAN  -0.024  -0.257  -0.009  0.056 
  (5.099)**  (7.545)**  (0.675)  (1.030) 
Definition of dx log(empl.) log(empl.) 
empl.>30th 
percentile 
empl.>30th 
percentile 
log(lab.prod.) log(lab.prod.)
lab.prod.>30th 
percentile 
lab.prod.>30th 
percentile 
Firms 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Event Window Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 
Event Window Length 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 
Observations Event Window 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered 
per trading day). See Table 2 and the text for details (equations 7 and 8 and Section 5.2). +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Table 6: Changes in Market-Model Parameters and Discount Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Return Return Return Return 
de * dx -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006
 (13.388)** (3.120)** (12.186)** (12.662)**
de * dx * dUS -0.423 -0.377 -0.448 -0.419
 (19.604)** (8.891)** (18.359)** (18.796)**
de * dx * dCAN -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015
 (3.727)** (1.625) (3.441)** (3.738)**
Abnormal Returns Model/ 
Estimation Procedure 
Market Model, 
event-induced 
change in βi 
Market Model, 
event-induced 
change in αi and 
βi 
Market Model, 
drop stocks 
with event-
induced change 
in eit 
Market Model, 
control for 
change in eit 
Firms 247 247 210 247 
Event Window Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 
Length Event Window 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 
Observations Event Window 494 494 420 494 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures 
in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered per trading day). See Table 2 and text for 
details (equations 7 and 8 and Section 5.2). +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level. 
 
 
Table 7: Input Tariffs and MNE Status as Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Return Return Return 
de * dx -0.011 -0.009 -0.016 
 (12.645)** (13.394)** (8.249)** 
de * dx * dUS -0.395 -0.555 -0.480 
 (17.511)** (15.780)** (10.915)** 
de * dx * dCAN -0.011 0.003 0.011 
 (2.581)* (0.487) (2.148)* 
de * dx * dINPUT -0.118  -0.192 
 (6.162)**  (3.819)** 
de * dMNE  0.018 0.017 
  (10.840)** (10.509)** 
de * dMNE * dUS  0.681 0.649 
  (6.760)** (6.252)** 
de * dMNE * dCAN  0.045 0.042 
  (0.987) (0.928) 
    
Firms 247 194 194 
Event Window Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 
Length Event Window 2 days 2 days 2 days 
Observations Event Window 494 388 388 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures 
in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered per trading day). See Table 2 and text for 
details (equations 7 and 8 and Section 5.2). +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level.
Table 8: Parameter Estimates for Non-Event Dates 
Coefficient estimate 
Mean 
(sd) 
Test mean≠0 
(t-stat) 
Percentiles 
1st 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th 99th 
β1e, log sales proxy 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.81 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.006 
β2e, Canadian tariff-log 
sales interaction 
-0.001 
(0.032) 
0.97 -0.079 -0.059 -0.045 0.000 0.039 0.048 0.069 
β3e, U.S. tariff-log sales 
interaction 
-0.005 
(0.184) 
0.80 -0.468 -0.312 -0.243 -0.012 0.230 0.291 0.466 
Number of draws 1,000 
Number of firms 247 
Length Event Window 2 days
Obs. Event Window 494 
Notes: Table shows means, standard deviation and percentiles for the distributions of coefficient 
estimates shown in the left column. Also shown is the t-stat of a regression of the coefficient estimates 
on a constant (column “Test mean≠0”). See text and Table 2 for further details. 
 
 
Table 9: Absolute Price Changes 
 (1) (2) 
 pt-pt-1 pt-pt-1 
de * dx -0.012 -0.065 
 (1.437) (1.394) 
de * dx * dUS -1.392 -16.549 
 (3.480)** (5.481)** 
de * dx * dCAN 0.252 2.909 
 (1.456) (2.227)* 
Export Status Definition log(sales) binary (sales>30th percentile) 
Firms 247 247 
Event Window Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 
Length Event Window 2 days 2 days 
Observations Event Window 494 494 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal price changes from OLS regressions (figures in 
brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered per trading day). See text for details (equation 
9 and Section 5.2). +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
  
Table 10: Additional Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Return Return Return Return Return Return 
de * dx 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 
 (9.139)** (2.197)* (8.710)** (1.883)+ (11.317)** (0.085) 
de * dx * dUS  -0.062 0.058  0.099 
  (7.491)** (5.997)**  (6.405)** 
de * dx * dCAN  -0.005 0.005  0.028 
  (3.525)** (2.374)*  (8.703)** 
Firms 247 247 247 247 247 247 
Event Window Oct.5, 1987 Oct.5, 1987
July 20, 
1988 
July 20, 
1988 
Nov. 7, 
1988 
Nov. 7, 
1988 
Length Event Window 1 day 1 day 1 day 1 day 1 day 1 day
Obs. Event Window 247 247 247 247 247 247 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures 
in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered per trading day). See Table 2 and text for 
details (equations 7 and 8 and Section 5.2). +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Quantification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Predicted Abnormal Returns       
- Small Firms -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.3% 1.6% 
- Large Firms 0.9% 1.1% 2.7% 0.9% 1.4% 4.7% 
Implied Profits Changes (0-100%)       
- Small Firms -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.3% 1.6% 
- Large Firms 0.9% 1.1% 2.7% 0.9% 1.4% 4.7% 
Implied Profits Changes (30-100%)       
- Small Firms -0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.0% 0.4% 2.4% 
- Large Firms 1.3% 1.6% 3.9% 1.3% 2.1% 6.9% 
Implied Profits Changes (50-100%)       
- Small Firms 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 3.5% 
- Large Firms 1.8% 2.3% 5.5% 1.8% 3.1% 10.2% 
Implied Profits Changes (70-100%)       
- Small Firms 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 1.3% 6.2% 
- Large Firms 3.2% 4.1% 9.8% 3.2% 6.2% 19.8% 
Definition of ‘large’ and ‘small’ 
>30th 
percent. 
>30th 
percent. 
>30th 
percent. 
log(sales) log(sales) log(sales)
Components used in computation 
of Predicted Abnormal Returns  
All 
No 
industry 
FE 
Inter-
actions 
only 
All 
No 
industry 
FE 
Inter-
actions 
only 
Notes: Table shows the averages of predicted abnormal returns and implied per-period profit changes 
for large and small firms. Columns 1-3 use a binary sales proxy and columns 4-6 use log sales. See 
equations (8) and (10) for the underlying specification and Tables 2 and 3, column 2, for the 
coefficient estimates used. The implied profit changes in rows 2-5 are based on the assumptions about 
the pre-post change in the likelihood of CUSFTA’s implementation indicated in the table. See text for 
details (Section 5.3). 
